Contrary to Baker and Wurgler (2002) , we find that the importance of historical average market-to-book in leverage regressions is not due to past equity market timing. We find that though equity transactions may be timed to equity market conditions, they do not have significant long-lasting effects on capital structure. Debt transactions exhibit timing patterns that are unlikely to induce a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage. We also find that historical average market-to-book has a significant effect on current financing and investment decisions, implying that it contains information about growth opportunities not captured by current market-to-book.
I.

Introduction
Traditional theories of corporate financing explain firms' financing choices as either the result of the fundamental trade-offs between various costs and benefits of debt and equity (Modigliani and Miller (1963) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Myers (1977) , Stulz (1990) , Hart and Moore (1995) , Ross (1977) ) or as the result of the pecking order in which firms prefer internal funds, then external debt, and, only as a last resort, external equity financing (Myers and Majluf (1984) ).
The existing empirical evidence on capital structure is mixed. On one hand, studies of determinants of debt ratios generally support the notion that firms strive to maintain target capital structures. For example, observed leverage ratios relate to firm characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, collateral (liquidation) value of assets, and the marginal tax rate in a manner consistent with the predictions of tradeoff theories.
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The tradeoff hypothesis is also supported by studies that find that the deviation from target leverage is an important determinant of the issuing (repurchasing) firm's debt/equity choice. 2 On the other hand, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) report that a simple pecking order model outperforms the target adjustment model in explaining the time-series variation in debt ratios.
A recent study by Baker and Wurgler (2002) questions the ability of the traditional theories to explain the observed corporate capital structures. They report that historical market-to-book ratios, averaged using a weighting scheme where market-to-book ratios in years with higher external financing receive higher weights, have a statistically and economically significant impact on current capital structure. The authors argue that neither the tradeoff nor the pecking order theory is consistent with the negative effect of long-past market-to-book ratios on firm leverage. Instead, they contend that firms time their net equity issues to equity market conditions, and that the changes in capital structure induced by these issues persist because firms do not care to adjust their debt ratios toward the target in subsequent years. As a result, observed capital structures reflect the cumulative outcome of timing the equity market.
The current paper does not question the empirical results in Baker and Wurgler (2002) . Instead, this paper develops new evidence that allows us to re-evaluate their conclusions about firm behavior and capital structure policy. Specifically, we focus on the claim that the significant negative effect of historical market-to-book ratios on leverage reflects the long-term impact of past attempts to time the equity market.
We find no convincing evidence that equity market timing is responsible for the strong negative effect of long-past market-to-book ratios on leverage. While our results suggest that equity issues are timed to periods of high market-to-book ratios, we also find that the effect of equity issues on leverage is economically small and short-lived. Equity repurchasers' timing patterns and their impact on leverage are even weaker. Debt issues have a significant long-lasting effect on capital structure, but their timing is unlikely to induce a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage. Debt reductions also have a significant effect on leverage, but the changes in market-to-book around debt 2 reductions are opposite to what the equity market timing implies and may induce a positive rather than a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage.
Our results also show that cross-sectional differences in market-to-book ratios of firms issuing and repurchasing debt and equity dwarf the changes in market-to-book experienced by these firms over time. Furthermore, these cross-sectional differences show strong persistence in time. For example, equity issuers' market-to-book ratios are significantly higher than debt issuers' ratios long before, and long after, the transaction.
These results imply that the negative effect of market-to-book on leverage and on the probability of debt vs. equity choice documented in numerous earlier studies is primarily a cross-sectional rather than a time-series phenomenon and, therefore, is more likely to reflect cross-sectional differences in growth opportunities than market timing. 3 We then discuss and test an alternative hypothesis that the historical weightedaverage market-to-book is related to target leverage because it contains information about growth opportunities not captured by current market-to-book ratio. First, we find that the effect of the weighted average of past market-to-book ratios on leverage remains significantly negative even after controlling for the cumulative effect of past net debt and net equity issues. This result is not consistent with the market timing hypothesis as, given the amounts of debt and equity issued in the past, the timing of these financing transactions should have no effect on the resulting leverage ratio. In contrast, if the weighted average market-to-book is a measure of growth opportunities then its impact on 3 observed debt ratios should, as we find, remain negative regardless of past financing activity.
Next, we find that firms with a higher weighted average of past market-to-book ratios are more likely to issue equity in the current period, while firms with a lower weighted average of past market-to-book ratios are more likely to issue debt in the current period. We also find that higher historical weighted-average market-to-book ratios are associated with higher current capital expenditures and higher current research and development expenses. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the importance of historical weighted-average market-to-book is due to its association with current growth opportunities. If the negative relation between historical weighted-average market-to-book and current capital structure simply reflects past market timing, then historical weighted-average market-to-book should have no effect on current financing and investment decisions, once we control for the pre-decision leverage, market-to-book, and other relevant factors. If, however, the importance of historical weighted-average market-to-book is due to its association with current growth opportunities, then it should have a significant impact on current decisions.
We also show that a negative effect on current leverage, change in leverage, and debt vs. equity issue choice can be obtained using a weighted average market-to-book based on future rather than past market-to-book ratios and external financing. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that both the historical average and the average of future market-to-book ratios are proxies for long-term growth opportunities that change slowly over time. The results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the negative link between the weighted average market-to-book and leverage is due to equity 4 market timing since future market timing should have no direct effect on current leverage and current decisions to change the leverage.
Other concurrent studies reach conclusions similar to ours. Welch (2004) shows that the patterns of equity issue timing practically disappear once dividend payments are subtracted from equity issues. Leary and Roberts (2004) find that the effect of an equity issue on leverage is erased within two to four years after the issue. They also find that the effect of external finance weighted average market-to-book is higher for firms with higher security issuance/repurchase costs and conclude that the persistent effects of past market-to-book ratios on leverage are consistent with a dynamic optimizing behavior in the presence of leverage adjustment costs. Kayhan and Titman (2004) decompose Baker and Wurgler's (2002) market timing measure into a short-term component capturing yearly timing of financing transactions and a long-term component capturing the persistence in market-to-book. They find that their yearly timing measure has a relatively weak and short-term effect on observed debt ratios and that the results in Baker and Wurgler (2002) are driven by the persistence in market-to-book rather than timing.
The current study makes a number of distinct contributions that differentiate it from these concurrent studies. First, the paper examines in detail the timing patterns of different types of corporate financing transactions and the interaction of the timing patterns with changes in leverage these transactions induce. This analysis allows us to conclude that only equity issues exhibit strong market timing patterns and that, overall, equity market timing is unlikely to induce a strong long-lasting negative relation between market-to-book and leverage.
Another contribution of the paper is that we extensively test and find support for 5 an alternative hypothesis that historical weighted-average market-to-book is related to target leverage because it contains information about growth opportunities not captured by current market-to-book ratio. Though Kayhan and Titman (2004) also discuss this hypothesis, they do not test it directly. Finally, the results about the effects of historical market-to-book ratios on current financing and investment decisions, developed in the course of testing this hypothesis, are new and interesting in their own right.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our data, variables, and replicates the main Baker-Wurgler results. Section III examines which external financing transactions have long-lasting effects on capital structure, and which transactions are possibly timed to equity market conditions. Section IV tests the hypothesis that the effects of weighted-average market-to-book in leverage regressions are driven by its association with growth opportunities. Section V summarizes our findings.
II. Capital Structure and Past Market Valuations: Baseline Results
A. Variable Definitions and Baker-Wurgler Leverage Regressions
Before proceeding to our main tests, we first replicate the main result from Baker and Wurgler (2002) on our sample. 
where e and d denote net equity and net debt issued, respectively. 9 Net equity issued is defined as (change in book equity -change in retained earnings (Item 36)). Net debt issued is defined as change in debt. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002) , negative weights in equation (2) are reset to zero.
For a firm observed at time (t), the EFWAMB is the weighted average of a timeseries of past market-to-book ratios, starting with the first observation available in our sample and ending with the market-to-book ratio at (t-1). The weight for each year is the ratio of external financing in that year to the total external financing raised by the firm in years (1) through (t-1). Thus, firms that issue securities when their market-to-book ratios are relatively high will tend to have high values of EFWAMB. 4 The results are similar when Tobit regressions with double censoring are used. 5 Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12). 6 Asset tangibility is measured as net property, plant, and equipment (Item 8) / total assets. 7 Profitability is measured as EBITDA (Item 13) / total assets. 8 MB is defined as (total assets (Item 6) -book value of equity + market value of equity) / total assets, where market value of equity is (price (Item 25) × shares outstanding (Item 199)) and book value of equity is (total assets -total liabilities -preferred stock + deferred taxes + convertible debt).
Regression (1) Second, our definition of debt excludes all other non-debt liabilities, as in Rajan and Zingales (1995) . Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that leverage ratio that includes total liabilities is not a good indicator of whether the firm is at risk of default in the near future, and that items like accounts payable are used for transactions purposes rather than for financing. Also, a significant portion of this paper is devoted to the analysis of debt and equity issues and repurchases. Studies that examine debt issues (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy (2003) , Leary and Roberts (2004) ) do not include non-debt liabilities in their analysis.
Overall, the results in Table 1 are similar to those in Baker and Wurgler (2002) .
Most importantly, EFWAMB has a statistically significant negative effect on the observed debt ratio. Baker and Wurgler (2002) interpret this result as implying that observed 8 capital structures reflect the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.
The significantly negative effect of current market-to-book in our III. External financing, market timing, and capital structure Baker and Wurgler (2002) interpret the negative relation between EFWAMB and current leverage (see Table 1 ) as consistent with the hypothesis that observed capital structures reflect the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. They contend that firms time equity issues to periods of relatively high market-to-book ratios and equity repurchases to periods of relatively low market-to-book ratios. This induces a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage. Because firms do not subsequently adjust their leverage towards the target, the changes in leverage induced by equity market timing persist. As a result, long-past market-to-book ratios have a negative effect on current debt ratios. The hypothesis that the timing of security issues and repurchases induces the observed negative relation between EFWAMB and leverage requires both that these transactions are timed to market conditions and that the timed transactions generate longlasting changes in capital structure. In this section, we test these two hypotheses.
A. Do equity transactions have long-lasting effects on capital structure?
To see whether security issues and repurchases generate long-lasting changes in corporate capital structure, we follow Hovakimian (2004) and examine the patterns of changes in leverage ratios of firms that issue and repurchase equity and debt.
We define security issues and repurchases based on the same Compustat data used to construct the EFWAMB, but screen out a large number of minor changes in debt and equity due to events, such as employee stock option exercises for example, that cannot be truly classified as financing transactions. 12 Specifically, a firm is defined as issuing equity (debt) when net equity (debt) issued exceeds 5% of the pre-issue value of total assets. A firm is defined as repurchasing equity (debt) when net equity (debt) repurchased exceeds 5% of the pre-issue value of total assets. The five percent screen has been used in a number of studies (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) , Korajczyk and Levy (2003) ) that have examined and confirmed the accuracy of such a classification scheme. In addition, since our goal is to test whether external financing transactions generate significant long-lasting effects on capital structure, it is natural to focus on relatively large transactions that are more likely to generate such effects. We examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in the 5% cutoff later in the paper.
11 Table 3 presents the mean and the median changes in leverage ratios at the time of the event (-1,0), and between pre-and post-event years (-1,+3). Hovakimian (2002) reports that the effects of equity transactions on capital structure differ significantly across firms that simultaneously issue or repurchase debt and those that do not.
Therefore, the results reported in Table 3 exclude firm-years with mixed debt and equity transactions, which will be discussed separately. The reported significance levels for medians are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test while the levels for means are based on the t-test.
The results in Table 3 reject the hypothesis that equity issues and repurchases have significant long-lasting effects on capital structure. The changes in leverage induced by equity issues and repurchases are small and transitory. The issuance of equity in year 0 significantly reduces the average issuer's debt ratio. However, this decline is economically small. The mean (median) decline in leverage between years -1 and 0 is -2.2 (-1.2) percent. Furthermore, the initial decline is offset by an upward trend in leverage in the post-issue years. The mean (median) change between years -1 and +3 is +1.0 (0.0) percent. In other words, the changes in leverage induced by equity issues are anything but persistent. 13 The upward drift in leverage is explained by relatively high debt issuance activity in post equity issue years. Over the three post-issue years (+1 through +3), new debt as a fraction of the increase in assets is 0.206, which is significantly higher than the leverage ratio of 0.152, observed in year 0.
We also find that both the mean (0.008) and the median (0.000) changes in 12 leverage induced by equity repurchases are economically trivial, though they are statistically significant. 14 The average leverage effect of equity repurchases is very small for two reasons. First, the average pre-transaction debt ratio of equity repurchasers is relatively low (0.143). 15 As a result, even in the absence of other factors affecting the leverage, the mean change in leverage due to equity repurchases in our sample would be only 0.012, while the median change would be 0.009. 16 Second, an equity repurchase increases leverage because it reduces the assets. However, even though the net equity repurchased in an average equity repurchase is 8.2 percent of assets, the total assets decline on average only by 2.7 percent. The offsetting increase in assets is financed by a small amount of new debt, and by current earnings, as well as by increases in non-debt current liabilities, such as accounts payable, that are not included in our measure of leverage.
In contrast to equity transactions, debt issues and reductions generate large and long-lasting changes in leverage. The mean (median) change in leverage due to a debt issue is +8.3 (+6.5) percent. The mean (median) change due to a debt reduction is -7.7 (-7.0) percent. These changes persist for at least three years after the transaction. The mean (median) change between years -1 and +3 is +6.3 (+5.2) percent for debt issues and -8.6
(-8.6) percent for debt reductions.
Overall, these results imply that long-term changes in leverage are driven by debt transactions rather than by equity transactions. This means that even if firms do time 14 The post equity repurchase trend of increasing leverage is due to strong debt issuance activity in these years. On average, new debt represents 30.8% of the increase in assets in years +1 through +3, which is significantly higher than the average debt ratio of 15.3% observed in year 0. 15 In fact, 19.2 percent of equity repurchasers in our sample have no debt at all. equity issues and repurchases, equity transaction timing is unlikely to be the main determinant of the observed leverage ratios.
B. Do firms time security issues and repurchases to equity market conditions?
The finding that equity transactions have only short-term effects on capital structure does not necessarily mean that equity market timing cannot have long-term effects. Though Baker and Wurgler (2002) discuss primarily net equity issue timing, the weights in EFWAMB are based on net total external financing and as such are affected by how debt transactions are timed relative to market-to-book.
Equity issue and repurchase timing may induce debt transactions to be timed to equity market conditions. If net financing needs are not perfectly correlated with equity market conditions and firms raise equity only when the market-to-book is high then firms in need of external funds will tend to raise debt when the market-to-book is low.
Similarly, if firms repurchase equity when the market-to-book is low then firms with excess cash will tend to retire debt when the market-to-book is high. Corporate financing transactions that are timed in this manner can potentially induce a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage.
In Table 4 , we test which (if any) security issues and repurchases are timed to equity market conditions by comparing the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the event year (MB(-1)) to five alternative benchmarks: the market-to-book ratio three years prior to the event year (MB(-3)); the market-to-book ratio three years after the event year (MB(+3)); the external-finance weighted-average market-to-book (EFWAMB); the time-14 series equal-weighted average of the firm's historical market-to-book ratios, starting with the first year the firm appears in our sample through year -1 relative to the event (EWAMB); and the time-series average of the firm's market-to-book ratios based on all years that the firm appears in our sample (AMB). The idea is to test whether the marketto-book ratio right before the transaction is unusually high or low relative to the firm's own experiences before and after the event.
The results for equity issues are consistent with market timing. The pretransaction market-to-book ratio MB(-1) of equity issuers is significantly higher than both the market-to-book three years before the issue (MB(-3)) and the historical equalweighted average market-to-book (EWAMB), implying that firms tend to issue equity following increases in market-to-book. MB(-1) is also significantly higher than the external finance weighted average market-to-book (EFWAMB), implying that the market-to-book ratios at the time of equity issuance tend to be higher than the average ratios associated with earlier security issues and repurchases by the same firm. Finally, an average equity issuer's market-to-book exceeds both the market-to-book three years after the issue (MB(+3)) and it's overall time-series market-to-book (AMB). These results imply that firms tend to issue equity when their market-to-book ratios are indeed unusually high.
The evidence on market timing of equity repurchases is weaker. The market-tobook ratios of equity repurchasers are lower than the benchmark ratios. However, the 15 difference between market-to-book ratios in years -1 and +3 is not statistically significant.
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The mean pre-debt-issue market-to-book is significantly lower than the market-tobook ratio three years prior to the issue or the equal-weighted or external-financeweighted historical average ratios. It is difficult, however, to argue that firms do not issue debt following increases in market-to-book when, in fact, almost half of debt issuers (49%) experience run-ups in market-to-book in years -3 through -1. In addition, unlike with equity issues, we do not observe a reversal of the pre-issue trend. The market-tobook ratios of debt issuers continue to decline after the issue. The market-to-book ratio in year +3 relative to the issue is significantly lower than the ratio in year -1. Furthermore, the pre-issue market-to-book is also significantly higher than the overall time-series average market-to-book of the firm. These results suggest that market-to-book ratios at the time of debt issuance are not particularly low by the issuing firms' standards, and that it is unlikely that the timing of debt issues is responsible for the strong negative relation between market-to-book and leverage.
Debt reductions are associated with market-to-book ratios that are significantly lower than each of our five benchmarks. While such a pattern may be consistent with some sort of timing, it can only induce a positive relation between the market-to-book and leverage.
It is also interesting to note that the cross-sectional differences in market-to-book ratios of firms issuing and repurchasing debt and equity are much larger than the changes 17 The insignificance of the post-repurchase run-up in market-to-book is not necessarily inconsistent with Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) . In fact, stock returns in our post-repurchase years are higher 16 17 in market-to-book experienced by these firms over time. For equity issuers, for example, the difference between average market-to-book ratios in years -3 and -1 is 0.101. For debt issuers this difference is -0.080. For comparison, in year -1, the average equity issuer's market-to-book ratio exceeds that of the average debt issuer by an economically and statistically significant 0.885.
These cross-sectional differences show strong persistence in time. In year -3, for example, the difference between the mean market-to-book ratios of equity issuers and debt issuers is 0.704, which is statistically significant at one percent. In fact, in the seven years around the event (from year -3 to year +3), the lowest average market-to-book ratio of equity issuers (1.920 in year +3) is significantly higher than the highest average market-to-book of debt issuers (1.518 in year -3). Similar patterns hold for all three timeseries averages (AMB, EWAMB, and EFWAMB) in Table 4 . For example, EFWAMBs in each of the years -3 through +3 relative to equity issue are all significantly higher than the corresponding EFWAMBs around debt issues.
The finding that cross-sectional differences in market-to-book are economically much more significant than changes in market-to-book over time is important. It implies that the effect of market-to-book on leverage is unlikely to be driven primarily by market timing. While market timing may affect when a particular firm issues equity, it is the cross-sectional differences in the average levels of market-to-book that seem to determine which firms tend to use external equity and which ones tend to use debt to satisfy their financing needs.
C. Mixed transactions
than the pre-repurchase returns, especially for "value" firms with low market-to-book ratios. The results are not consistent with the hypothesis that equity market timing induces a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage. Whether accompanied by equity issues or repurchases, debt issues generate statistically and economically significant increases in leverage, which persist for at least three years after the transaction. However, the market-to-book ratios associated with these transactions are higher, in most cases significantly, than each of the five benchmarks presented in Panel B
of Table 5 . These patterns can induce a positive rather than a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage.
Similarly, debt reductions produce significant long-term declines in leverage regardless of whether they are accompanied by equity issues or repurchases. The marketto-book ratios associated with debt reductions combined with equity issues are not significantly different from our five benchmarks. The market-to-book ratios of debt reductions combined with equity repurchases are significantly lower than any of the five benchmarks, implying a positive rather than a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage.
D. Robustness of the results
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The tests reported in tables 3, 4, and 5 assume that different observations of the same financing event are independent. We also re-run our t-tests allowing for dependence in two different ways. First, we relax the assumption that financing transactions by the same firm are independent. For each firm, we calculate the mean changes in leverage and market-to-book and then calculate the t-statistics using the cross-section of firm-level means. Next, we relax the assumption that financing transactions by firms in the same industry are independent. For each industry, as defined by four-digit SIC codes, we calculate the mean changes in leverage and market-to-book and then calculate the tstatistics using the cross-section of industry-level means.
Most of the significance levels of changes in leverage reported in Table 3 and Panel A of Table 5 do not change under any of the alternative tests. Only for equity issues, the change in leverage between years -1 and +3 becomes insignificant when industry level means are used. In Table 4 , the difference between the equity issuers' market-to-book and their equal-weighted average market-to-book becomes insignificant when firm-level means are used. The differences between the equity repurchasers' market-to-book and all three average market-to-book ratios are insignificant when industry-level means are used. The difference between the debt issuers' market-to-book and their time-series average market-to-book (AMB) is insignificant when firm-level means are used. In Panel B of Table 5 , the difference between MB(-1) and MB(-3) for firms that issue both debt and equity and the difference between MB(-1) and EWAMB for firms that issue debt and repurchase equity are insignificant under each of the two alternative tests. Overall, these results do not change our earlier conclusion that equity market timing is unlikely to have a significant long-lasting effect on capital structure.
Though the five percent screen used to identify security issues and repurchases has been used in many other studies, it is ad-hoc. It is possible, for example, that larger transactions may be more carefully timed or that larger equity transactions may generate larger and more persistent changes in leverage. To see whether our results are robust to 19 changes in the cutoff, we repeat the analysis after increasing it to ten percent. This change results in a substantial decline in the number of security issues and repurchases. As a result, the market timing patterns for equity repurchases, equity repurchases accompanied by debt issues, and equity issues accompanied by debt reductions become insignificant.
Other results remain qualitatively the same.
To summarize, sensitivity analysis reinforces our conclusion that equity market timing is unlikely to generate a strong long-lasting relation between historical market-tobook and leverage.
E. Discussion of the results
Both Baker and Wurgler (2002) and the current paper find that the negative relation between EFWAMB and leverage is very strong and robust. For this relation to be driven by equity market timing, the timing patterns of corporate financing transactions
and their effects on leverage should be equally strong and robust. However, the analysis of changes in leverage and market-to-book around corporate financing events fails to show convincingly how equity market timing could be responsible for the strong negative effect of long-past market-to-book ratios on leverage.
Transactions with strong timing patterns either have no significant lasting effect on leverage (equity issues and repurchases) or their effect on debt ratio implies a positive rather than a negative relation between EFWAMB and leverage (debt reductions). Other transactions (debt issues) have strong long-lasting effects on leverage, but show no strong equity market timing pattern. These results imply that past attempts to time the equity market are unlikely to have a significant effect on current capital structure.
20
IV. Is external finance weighted-average market-to-book related to growth opportunities?
In this section, we discuss and test an alternative hypothesis that historical market-to-book is related to current target debt ratio because it complements the current market-to-book as a proxy for growth opportunities. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that the persistent effects of past market-to-book on leverage are hard to explain within the tradeoff theory because it implies that "… temporary fluctuations in market-to-book … should have temporary effects." What we suggest here is that temporary fluctuations in market-to-book may have no effect on target leverage at all if these fluctuations are viewed by managers as noise.
An important premise of the market-timing hypothesis is that managers believe that their shares are often mispriced. If so, then the market-to-book ratio at any point in time reflects both the firm's growth opportunities and the extent of misvaluation. For example, if an increase in market-to-book is driven by overvaluation, then the growth opportunities could be more modest and the target debt ratio could be higher than implied by the inflated market-to-book. If the market corrects these valuation errors over time and if the set of future investment opportunities of the firm changes relatively slowly, then the firm's historical average market-to-book ratio could be a less noisy measure of its growth opportunities than the current market-to-book.
A. Market timing and leverage
According to the market-timing hypothesis, firms do not have target debt ratios.
Therefore, the only reason observed debt ratios may relate to market-to-book is because 21 firms time their financing activities in such a way that net equity issuance increases with market-to-book while net debt issuance declines with market-to-book. Other things being equal, high net equity issuance and low net debt issuance should result in low debt ratios.
Hence, a negative relation between market-to-book and leverage ensues.
This description implies that, holding the amounts of debt and equity issued in the past constant, the current leverage ratio should not depend on how well these issues were timed. Therefore, if the importance of external finance weighted average market-to-book in leverage regressions in Table 1 is driven purely by past market timing, EFWAMB should have no effect on leverage if the amounts of net equity and net debt issued in the past were controlled for in regression (1). In contrast, if EFWAMB is a measure of growth opportunities and if firms with high growth opportunities prefer to have low debt ratios, then the observed debt ratios should be related to EFWAMB even after controlling for past issuance activity.
We test these two hypotheses about the nature of EFWAMB by introducing two additional variables into regression equation (1):
DbIs EqIs
In (4), EqIs is the cumulative net equity issued and DbIs is the cumulative net debt issued over the same time period used to calculate the EFWAMB. , The results reported in the first two columns of Table 6 show that the effect of EFWAMB on leverage remains significantly negative even after controlling for the cumulative effect of debt and equity issues and repurchases on leverage. This result is not consistent with the market timing hypothesis as, controlling for the amounts of debt and equity issued in the past, the timing of these financing transactions should have no effect on the resulting leverage ratio. Table 3 , the effect of net debt financing on leverage (0.188) is statistically and economically much stronger than the effect of net equity financing (-0.022). The results for other variables are similar to the results in Table 1, except size is insignificant in Table 6 .
Consistent with our results in
It is possible that linear specification (4) does not allow us to fully control for the effects of financing activities on leverage. To strengthen our control for the effect of net financing, we re-estimate regression (4) on a subsample of firms with very small amounts of net debt and net equity issued. Specifically, we limit our sample to observations with cumulative past net debt (equity) financing not exceeding five percent of assets. The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 6 . The effects of both cumulative net debt issued and cumulative net equity issued on leverage are now insignificant, implying that we were successful in choosing a sub-sample where the effect of external financing on leverage is minimized. In such a sub-sample, we would expect the timing of remaining financing transactions to have no effect on leverage since the transactions themselves are unimportant. However, the results show that the effect of EFWAMB remains significantly negative, implying that it is due to factors other than market timing, such as growth opportunities. 
Determinants of changes in leverage
If the importance of external finance weighted average market-to-book in leverage regressions in Table 1 is driven purely by past market timing, EFWAMB should have no effect on incremental decisions to change the current capital structure once we control for the pre-decision leverage, market-to-book, and other relevant factors. If, however, the importance of EFWAMB is due to its association with growth opportunities, then it should have a significant impact on current financing and investment decisions.
In the first column of Table 7 , we report the estimation results of the following regression of changes in leverage on the set of independent variables used in Table 1, plus the lagged leverage ratio as an additional regressor.
The dependent variable, ∆Leverage t , is the change in leverage in year (t), Leverage(t)-
Leverage(t-1).
Because leverage is bounded between 0 and 1, firms with high leverage are more likely to experience declines in leverage, and firms with low leverage are more likely to experience increases in leverage. Lagged leverage is included to control for this effect. We should note that Baker and Wurgler (2002) estimate a change in leverage regression which is similar to the one in our The results imply that changes in leverage are positively related to asset tangibility and negatively related to market-to-book ratio, EFWAMB, and lagged leverage. The statistically significant negative coefficient on EFWAMB is inconsistent with Baker and Wurgler's (2002) timing hypothesis, according to which the effect of EFWAMB arises because past financing transactions were timed and because the effect of these past transactions on leverage was not offset by other transactions in subsequent years. The results in Table 7 establish the existence of a more direct channel via which EFWAMB affects current capital structure. This direct negative effect of EFWAMB cannot be explained by persistence in market-to-book ratios since we control for the most recent pre-issue market-to-book. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that EFWAMB is a proxy for growth opportunities and as such is negatively related to target debt ratio.
The magnitude of the effect of EFWAMB on change in leverage is relatively small. However, it is stronger than the effect of the current market-to-book. More generally, relatively modest effects of all the independent variables in Table 7 are at least partially due to the fact that changes in leverage reflect both managerial choices and random unintended fluctuations in leverage. In the next subsection, we test whether EFWAMB affects managerial decisions regarding the form of financing.
C. Determinants of debt versus equity choice
The second set of results in Table 7 is for the following probit regression, modeling the choice between issuing debt and issuing equity and estimated using only observations where either debt or equity is issued. .
(8)
The dependent variable, D*, in regression equation (8) is a latent continuous variable reflecting the propensity of the firm to issue debt rather than equity. Its observable counterpart is a binary indicator set to one for firms that issue debt and set to zero for firms that issue equity. In addition to variables used in our prior regressions, independent variables in regression equation (8) 22 Item 52, scaled by total assets. NOLC may also proxy for the firm's non-debt tax shields, which were shown to reduce the tax advantage of debt financing and, therefore, lower the firm's target debt ratio (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) ). 23 The book value dilution dummy is set equal to one when the firm's market-to-book ratio is greater than one.
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If EFWAMB measures past market timing and affects current capital structure because firms do not offset the deviations from the target induced by past market timing, then it should have no impact on the current debt vs. equity issue decision. On the other hand, if EFWAMB proxies for growth opportunities, then it should have a significant negative impact on the current debt vs. equity issue choice.
Contrary to the hypothesis that the importance of EFWAMB in leverage regressions (Table 1) simply reflects the cumulative effects of past market timing, the results in Table 7 show that EFWAMB is an important predictor of the current choice between issuing debt and issuing equity. Specifically, the probability of debt issuance vis-à-vis equity issuance declines with EFWAMB. The statistically significant negative coefficient estimate for EFWAMB implies that managers of firms with high EFWAMB are more likely to issue equity than issue debt when they seek external financing. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that EFWAMB complements the most recent market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities. The negative effect of EFWAMB is economically significant. The marginal effect of EFWAMB on the probability of debt issuance is -4.3 percent. The results for other independent variables are consistent with earlier studies.
D.
Alternative weighted-average market-to-book ratios and leverage
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The results thus far are consistent with the hypothesis that the historical weightedaverage market-to-book is related to long-term growth prospects of the firm, and that its significance in leverage regressions that control for the most recent values of market-tobook is due to pricing errors that make the recent market-to-book ratio a noisy measure of future investment opportunities. If this is correct, then any other averaging of market-to-book over time should produce much the same results. In fact, Baker and Wurgler (2002) report that other weighting schemes, including using equal-weighted historical average, produce similar results. However, it could be argued that, whatever the weighting scheme, historical average market-to-book reflects the opportunities for market timing that existed, and possibly were taken advantage of, in the past.
In this section, we re-estimate the leverage regression from Table 1 as well as the change in leverage and the debt vs. equity choice regressions from Table 7 using external finance weighted-average market-to-book based on future rather than past market-tobook ratios and external financing. We define the future external finance weighted average market-to-book, FEFWAMB, as follows. 
Our rationale for substituting FEFWAMB for EFWAMB in these regressions is simple. If, as we argue, growth opportunities change slowly, then both the historical average and the future average market-to-book are proxies for long-term growth opportunities of the firm. As such, their effects on capital structure choice should be qualitatively similar. If, on the other hand, EFWAMB reflects past market timing, then FEFWAMB should reflect future market timing and, as such, should have no effect on current leverage and current decisions to change the leverage.
The results presented in Table 8 are consistent with the hypothesis that weighted average market-to-book is a proxy for investment opportunities. The coefficient estimate 28 for FEFWAMB is significantly negative. As in all of our regressions, we control for the most recent market-to-book. Therefore, the effects of EFWAMB and FEFWAMB cannot be attributed to correlation between these time-series averages of market-to-book ratios and the current market-to-book. 25 The results for other variables are similar to the results reported in tables 1 and 7, except the effect of the current market-to-book in the change in leverage regression is positive. We conclude that the significant effect of a firm's timeseries weighted average market-to-book on its capital structure is unlikely to be due to equity market timing.
E. Investment regressions
If EFWAMB is indeed a proxy for growth opportunities then we can expect it to have a significant impact on corporate investment. However, Baker and Wurgler (2002) report that they find the relation between EFWAMB and future investment to be negative. 26 In this section we attempt to reconcile our conclusions with this result by estimating a number of regressions of the following form.
The dependent variable in (10) is corporate investment scaled by total assets. The regressors include the set of variables used in the leverage regression in Table 1 and two additional variables, financial slack and leverage. 27 The slack is included to control for the possibility that EFWAMB may be related to current investment because successful 25 We also re-run the regressions in Table 8 with both EFWAMB and FEFWAMB on the right hand side, which would ensure that FEFWAMB is not simply a proxy for EFWAMB. In these unreported regressions, both EFWAMB and FEFWAMB had significantly negative effects on the dependent variable. past market timers may have accumulated substantial amounts of cash that can be used to finance current investment. The leverage is included to control for the possibility that successful past timers may have low leverage, which may allow them to finance large investment projects by raising large amounts of new debt. Two of the regressors, marketto-book and profitability, have been traditionally used in investment regressions (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) ). Table 9 presents the estimation results for regression (10) using three measures of corporate investment. The first set of results is for a regression of capital expenditures.
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The second set of results is for a regression of research and development (R&D)
expenses. 29 These results imply that both capital expenditures and R&D expenses increase with external finance weighted average market-to-book. The coefficient estimates for EFWAMB are significantly positive in both regressions. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that EFWAMB contains information about growth opportunities and that this information is not reflected in other proxies for growth opportunities.
The third set of results in Table 9 is obtained by measuring investment as change in total assets excluding cash and short-term investments as Baker and Wurgler (2002) do. Consistent with their results, the effect of EFWAMB is significantly negative.
To understand the sources of the differences between these results, we reestimated regression (10) measuring investment as change in current assets (excluding 27 Financial slack is defined as cash and short-term investments (Item 1), scaled by total assets. 28 Item 128. cash and short-term investments), 30 change in net fixed assets, 31 and change in gross fixed assets. 32 In these unreported regressions, we found the effect of EFWAMB on change in current assets and change in net fixed assets to be significantly negative, but its effect on change in gross fixed assets to be insignificant. Thus, it appears that the negative effect of EFWAMB on change in assets in Table 9 is driven by its negative effect on change in current assets, and its positive effect on depreciation and amortization.
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To understand why EFWAMB has a positive effect on capital expenditures but an insignificant effect on change in gross fixed assets, we also examined the effect of EFWAMB on acquisitions and asset sales, which, like capital expenditures, affect the change in gross fixed assets. We found the effect of EFWAMB on both acquisitions and asset sales to be insignificant. However, when we estimated probit regressions predicting the probability of an acquisition or a sale of assets, the results were consistent with the hypothesis that EFWAMB is a proxy for growth opportunities. The probability of an acquisition increased with EFWAMB, while the probability of an asset sale declined with EFWAMB.
To summarize, the effects of EFWAMB on capital expenditures, research and development expenses, and the probabilities of asset sales and acquisitions are consistent with the hypothesis that EFWAMB contains information about growth opportunities.
However, the incremental information in EFWAMB does not appear relevant for The difference between changes in gross and net fixed assets is due to depreciation and amortization.
determining the size of an acquisition or an asset sale. Finally, EFWAMB has a negative effect on changes in current assets and a positive effect on depreciation. The latter might reflect higher past investment rates of firms with higher past market-to-book ratios.
F. Discussion
The preceding results show that external finance weighted average market-tobook has a significant impact on current debt versus equity issue choice, current changes in leverage, current capital expenditures, and current research and development expenses.
Furthermore, substituting the weighted-average of future market-to-book for the weighted-average of past market-to-book ratios does not change the relation between the weighted-average market-to-book and capital structure. Could these results be induced by market timing?
One explanation, consistent with market timing, for the negative effect of EFWAMB in Table 6 would be that successful past timers (those with high EFWAMB) may choose to issue equity and reduce their leverage to ensure that they can take advantage of market timing opportunities in the future. High leverage may hamper the market timing ability of a firm by exhausting its debt capacity and forcing it to issue equity when it is in need of external financing in times of low market-to-book ratios.
However, if firms choose low leverage in order to be able to time the equity market in the future, then it is no longer the case that firms do not care about their leverage ratios, and that low leverage is just an unintended consequence of opportunistic equity market timing.
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Furthermore, we believe that the evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that EFWAMB is a proxy for growth opportunities. Specifically, it is not clear why a firm that was not a successful timer in the past (a firm with low EFWAMB), would not want to improve its prospects for future timing by issuing equity and increasing its debt capacity. Or why its past inability to time the market should preclude it from issuing equity if its current characteristics (e.g., current market-to-book, leverage, profitability, etc.) call for equity issuance.
In fact, we would argue that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher past EFWAMB would have a higher threshold for issuing equity than those with low EFWAMB. A high value of EFWAMB implies that the firm was able to raise external financing when its market-to-book was high. If so, for a given value of current market-to-book ratio, the higher the EFWAMB, the less likely it is that the firm's shares are significantly overvalued and, therefore, the less likely it should be that the firm would issue equity. In other words, the effects of EFWAMB in Table 7 would be positive if they were due to market timing.
Similarly, if the effects of FEFWAMB in Table 8 are due to managers' expectations of future market timing opportunities, then, holding current market-to-book constant, firms with better future timing opportunities (i.e., higher FEFWAMB) should be less likely to issue equity now. In other words, the effect of FEFWAMB on ∆Leverage and on debt vs. equity choice in Table 8 should be positive rather than negative.
To summarize, we believe that our results are unlikely to be due to market timing and that they are most consistent with the hypothesis that EFWAMB contains information about growth opportunities not captured by current market-to-book.
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V.
Conclusions
A recent study by Baker and Wurgler (2002) questions the ability of the traditional tradeoff and pecking order theories to explain the observed corporate capital structures. Baker and Wurgler (2002) report that historical market-to-book ratios, averaged using a weighting scheme where market-to-book ratios in years with higher external financing receive higher weights, have a statistically and economically significant impact on the current capital structure. The authors conclude that observed capital structures reflect the cumulative outcome of timing the equity market.
Our findings question the main conclusions in Baker and Wurgler (2002) . First, we find no evidence of significant equity market timing for debt issues and debt reductions. Second, while our results are consistent with market timing of equity issues and, to a lesser extent, of equity repurchases, we find that the effects of equity transactions on capital structure are small and transitory, implying that equity transaction timing is unlikely to be responsible for significant long-lasting effects of market-to-book on leverage. Third, the patterns of changes in market-to-book and debt ratios around a number of transactions (debt reductions, debt issues combined with equity issues or repurchases, debt reductions combined with equity repurchases) are such that these transactions may induce a positive rather than a negative relation between market-tobook and leverage.
Fourth, our evidence supports an alternative hypothesis that external finance weighted-average market-to-book is related to target leverage because it contains information about future growth opportunities. Specifically, we find that current 34 financing and investment decisions are affected by EFWAMB. This result cannot be explained by past market timing, because we control for the most recent values of market-to-book and other relevant firm characteristics. Furthermore, substituting weighted average of future market-to-book ratios for historical weighted average in the leverage regression, we find that current leverage ratios are related to future weighted average market-to-book. These results are inconsistent with the market timing explanation but are consistent with the hypothesis that market-to-book ratios averaged over time reflect slowly changing growth opportunities.
The paper develops a number of other interesting results. We find, for example, that cross-sectional differences in market-to-book ratios of firms issuing and repurchasing debt and equity dwarf the changes in market-to-book experienced by these firms over time. Furthermore, in each of the seven years around the event examined in the paper, the average equity issuer's market-to-book is significantly higher than that of the average debt issuer. These results imply that the effect of market-to-book on leverage is not driven primarily by market timing. While market timing may affect when a particular firm issues equity, it is the cross-sectional differences in the average level of market-tobook that appear to determine which firms tend to use external equity and which ones tend to use debt to satisfy their financing needs.
To summarize, the results in this paper do not support the hypothesis that the significant long-lasting effects of market-to-book ratios on capital structure reflect past equity market timing. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that external finance weighted-average market-to-book contains information about the firm's growth opportunities not captured by current market-to-book. Leverage is long-term debt (Item 9) + short-term debt (Item 34) over total assets (Item 6). The market-tobook ratio is the (total assets -book value of equity + market value of equity)/total assets. Book value of equity is (total assets (Item 6) -total liabilities (Item 181) -preferred stock (Item 10) + deferred taxes (Item 35)). EFWAMB is the external finance weighted-average market-to-book. Size is the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12). Tangibility is measured as net property, plant, and equipment (Item 8)/total assets. Profitability is EBITDA (Item 13) divided by total assets. Robust t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. Values significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and ** respectively. The sample covers security issuance and repurchase behavior from 1982 to 2000. Leverage is long-term debt (Item 9) + short-term debt (Item 34) over total assets (Item 6). The market-to-book ratio is the (total assets -book value of equity + market value of equity)/total assets. Book value of equity is (total assets (Item 6) -total liabilities (Item 181) -preferred stock (Item 10) + deferred taxes (Item 35)). EFWAMB is the external finance weighted-average market-to-book. Size is the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12). Tangibility is measured as net property, plant, and equipment (Item 8)/total assets. Profitability is EBITDA (Item 13) divided by total assets. Leverage is long-term debt (Item 9) + short-term debt (Item 34) over total assets (Item 6). Equity issues (repurchases) are instances when net equity issued (repurchased) exceeds five percent of total assets. Net equity issued (repurchased) is measured as the (proceeds from sale of common and preferred stock (Item 108) -amount of common and preferred stock repurchased (Item 115) -change in the value of preferred stock (Item 10))/total assets. Debt issues (reductions) are instances when net debt issued (retired) exceeds five percent of total assets. Net debt issued (retired) is measured as the (change in the book value of total debt)/total assets. Changes significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and ** respectively. The market-to-book ratio (MB) is (total assets (Item 6) -book value of equity (Item 60) + market value of equity)/total assets. Equity issues (repurchases) are instances when net equity issued (repurchased) exceeds five percent of total assets. Net equity issued (repurchased) is measured as the (proceeds from sale of common and preferred stock (Item 108) -amount of common and preferred stock repurchased (Item 115) -change in the value of preferred stock (Item 10))/total assets. Debt issues (reductions) are instances when net debt issued (retired) exceeds five percent of total assets. Net debt issued (retired) is measured as the (change in the book value of total debt)/total assets. Values significantly different from MB(-1) at 5% and 1% level are marked * and ** respectively. Leverage is long-term debt (Item 9) + short-term debt (Item 34) over total assets (Item 6). The market-to-book ratio is (total assets (Item 6) -book value of equity (Item 60) + market value of equity)/total assets. Equity issues (repurchases) are instances when net equity issued (repurchased) exceeds five percent of total assets. Net equity issued (repurchased) is measured as the (proceeds from sale of common and preferred stock (Item 108) -amount of common and preferred stock repurchased (Item 115) -change in the value of preferred stock (Item 10))/total assets. Debt issues (reductions) are instances when net debt issued (retired) exceeds five percent of total assets. Net debt issued (retired) is measured as the (change in the book value of total debt)/total assets. Values significantly different from MB(-1) at 5% and 1% level are marked * and ** respectively. Leverage is long-term debt (Item 9) + short-term debt (Item 34) over total assets (Item 6). The market-tobook ratio is the (total assets -book value of equity + market value of equity)/total assets. Book value of equity is (total assets (Item 6) -total liabilities (Item 181) -preferred stock (Item 10) + deferred taxes (Item 35)). EFWAMB is the external finance weighted-average market-to-book. Size is the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12). Tangibility is measured as net property, plant, and equipment (Item 8)/total assets. Profitability is EBITDA (Item 13) divided by total assets. Robust t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. Values significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and ** respectively. Leverage is long-term debt (Item 9) + short-term debt (Item 34) over total assets (Item 6). Size is the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12). Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment (Item 8)/total assets. Profitability is EBITDA (Item 13) divided by beginning-of-the-period total assets. Market-to-book ratio is the (total assets -book value of equity (Item 60) + market value of equity)/total assets. EFWAMB is the external finance weighted-average market-to-book. Industry leverage is the median leverage for firms with the same four-digit SIC. R&D intensity is research and development expenses (Item 46)/sales. Selling expenses is selling and administrative expenses (Item 189) / sales. NOLC is net operating loss carryforwards (Item 52)/total assets. Return is the stock return in the year before the issue. MB>1 indicator is set to one when the market-to-book ratio is greater than one. Dilution indicator is set to one when issuing equity dilutes EPS more than issuing debt does. Debt vs. equity choice regression includes year indicator variables, which are not reported. Robust t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. Values significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and ** respectively. For the debt vs. equity choice model, a pseudo-R 2 is reported instead of R 2 . Leverage is long-term debt (Item 9) + short-term debt (Item 34) over total assets (Item 6). Size is the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12). Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment (Item 8)/total assets. Profitability is EBITDA (Item 13) divided by beginning-of-the-period total assets. Market-to-book ratio is the (total assets -book value of equity (Item 60) + market value of equity)/total assets. FEFWAMB is the future external finance weighted-average market-tobook. Industry leverage is the median leverage for firms with the same four-digit SIC. R&D intensity is research and development expenses (Item 46)/sales. Selling expenses is selling and administrative expenses (Item 189)/sales. NOLC is net operating loss carryforwards (Item 52)/total assets. Return is the stock return in the year before the issue. MB>1 indicator is set to one when the market-to-book ratio is greater than one. Dilution indicator is set to one when issuing equity dilutes EPS more than issuing debt does. Debt vs. equity choice regression includes year indicator variables, which are not reported. Robust t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. Values significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and ** respectively. For the debt vs. equity choice model, a pseudo-R 2 is reported instead of R 2 . Capital expenditures is Item 128 / total assets (Item 6). Research and development expenses is Item 46 / total assets. Asset growth is change in total assets/total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of sales (Item 12). Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment (Item 8)/total assets. Profitability is EBITDA (Item 13) divided by beginning-of-the-period total assets. Market-to-book ratio is the (total assets -book value of equity (Item 60) + market value of equity)/total assets. EFWAMB is the external finance weighted-average market-to-book. Robust t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering. Values significantly different from zero at 1% level are marked **.
